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The interdisciplinary research project AviClim (Including Aviation in International
Protocols for Climate Protection) has explored the feasibility for including aviation’s full
climate impact, i.e., both long-lived CO2 and short-lived non-CO2 effects, in international
protocols for climate protection and has investigated the economic impacts. Short-lived
non-CO2 effects of aviation are NOx emissions, H2O emissions or contrail cirrus, for instance.
Four geopolitical scenarios have been designed which differ concerning the level of inter-
national support for climate protecting measures. These scenarios have been combined
alternatively with an emissions trading scheme on CO2 and non-CO2 species, a climate
tax and a NOx emission charge combined with CO2 trading and operational measures (such
as lower flight altitudes). Modelling results indicate that a global emissions trading scheme
for both CO2 and non-CO2 emissions would be the best solution from an economic and
environmental point of view. Costs and impacts on competition could be kept at a rela-
tively moderate level and effects on employment are moderate, too. At the same time, envi-
ronmental benefits are noticeable.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Introduction
Aviation contributes to climate change by both CO2 and non-CO2 effects, such as ozone and methane changes from NOx
emissions or contrails and contrail cirrus: In 2005 aircraft-induced CO2 contributed 1.6% to the total anthropogenic radiative
forcing (Lee et al., 2009), while the total aviation effect, i.e., the sum of the CO2 and the non-CO2 effects, amounted to 4.9%.
During the next decades international aviation is expected to grow significantly (e.g., ICAO, 2013a). While international avi-
ation’s carbon dioxide emissions have been regulated in several countries in the recent years, this is not the case for most of
aviation’s non-CO2 climate effects. To complicate matters, aviation-induced clouds and the effects of NOx emissions at cruise
altitudes are neither fully understood from an atmospheric sciences point of view nor investigated with regard to the pos-
sible introduction of regulatory measures at this point.
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on the international level. Here, both the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) which is the UN agency responsible
for international civil aviation, and any supranational/international political institution of greater regional importance such
as the European Commission will have to be involved. With regard to expected future annual growth rates of about 5% on
average (ICAO, 2013a), the implementation of global or at least internationally coordinated instruments for the reduction of
the non-CO2 impact of international aviation on climate change seems to be necessary expeditiously.
How can international aviation be best included in international protocols for climate protection from an economic point
of view? This question has been addressed by the research project AviClim (Including Aviation in International Protocols for
Climate Protection), funded by the German Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (BMBF), see Scheelhaase et al.
(2015) for the final report of this project. The present paper is organized as follows: section ‘Impact of aviation on climate
and regulatory measures to mitigate this impact’ provides an overview of the impact of aviation on climate and the current
regulatory measures to mitigate this impact. Section ‘Methodological approach’ summarizes AviClim’s methodological
approach. Section ‘Main results’ presents and discusses the main economic and environmental results. Section ‘Summary
and recommendations’ provides conclusions and recommendations.Impact of aviation on climate and regulatory measures to mitigate this impact
Impact of aviation on climate
The impact of aviation on climate is often described in terms of radiative forcing (RF), which is a measure for the pertur-
bation of the Earth’s natural radiative equilibrium due to the cumulative effect of a (mostly) anthropogenic change of the
atmospheric composition relative to the pre-industrial state (e.g., IPCC, 1999). The expected new equilibrium (near) surface
temperature change DT is to first order proportional to RF if the change of the atmospheric composition remains constant. A
positive RF results in a warming, while a negative RF results in a cooling of the climate.
Radiative forcing from aviation is composed of several components. CO2 with an atmospheric lifetime up to millennia and
H2Owith a lifetime between hours andmonths contribute to a positive RF. The NOx emissions have several effects: On a rather
short timescale, ozone (O3) is formed via smog reactions (warming effect) with a lifetime in the range from weeks to months.
As a secondary effect, methane (CH4) in the atmosphere is destroyed (cooling effect) with a lifetime of about a decade. Finally,
from the reduced methane a secondary reduction of the ozone concentration results (cooling effect), which has the same life-
time as methane. In total, the RF from NOx is positive (warming). Individual contrails (line-shaped high altitude clouds trig-
gered by the aircraft water emissions) and the associated contrail cirrus (cirrus clouds evolving from contrail at suitable
atmospheric conditions) may warm or cool the atmosphere, depending on daytime, cloud properties and the reflectivity of
the surface underneath the contrail or contrail cirrus. On global and annual average these cloud effects result in a positive
RF, which is of a similar magnitude than the RF from CO2 (e.g., Lee et al., 2009, 2010; Burkhardt and Kärcher, 2011).
Different to most sectors of human activity, aviation’s non-CO2 effects play an important role and contribute about 2/3 of
the total aviation forcing (Lee et al., 2009). Contrary to CO2 emissions, aviation’s non-CO2 effects depend on flight altitude,
geographical location, day time, weather situation, etc. (e.g., Fichter et al., 2005; Mannstein et al., 2005; Fichter, 2009;
Frömming et al., 2012). Due to the different lifetimes and due to the spatially dependent impacts, the climate change induced
by the aviation non-CO2 effects is not proportional to the CO2 emissions. Therefore, accounting aviation’s non-CO2 effects by
simply applying a factor to the CO2 emissions, as suggested by, e.g., the European Parliament, is not appropriate as it would
provide incorrect incentives (see also Forster et al., 2006).
Currently, the science community discusses how to weigh short-lived non-CO2 effects in relation to CO2 (e.g., Fuglestvedt
et al., 2010; Deuber et al., 2014). As mentioned above a simple (constant) factor on CO2 is inadequate. Calculating the indi-
vidual contributions to RF is an important method to understand the climate impact of aviation but offers no tool for mit-
igating future aircraft effects. As a ‘‘backward looking” tool RF accounts for the emissions of the past and not for future
emissions. For long-lived species, such as the species regulated by the Kyoto Protocol, equivalent CO2 on the basis of the
Global Warming Potential (GWP, time integrated RF) proved to be a suitable tool (e.g., Fuglestvedt et al., 2010). However,
this metric has severe deficits when considering short-term climate impacts. Up to now, no consensus has been reached
on the most appropriate metric. But the choice of this metric is not arbitrary; it should be followed from the application
it is used for (Grewe and Dahlmann, 2015). For the present study, the Average Temperature Response (ATR), which is the
mean temperature change over a time horizon of 20 and 50 years (atr_20 and atr_50) turned out to be a suitable metric
to compare non-CO2 effects among each other and with CO2 (Dahlmann, 2012).Regulatory approaches to limit aviation’s impact on climate
Which regulatory approaches for the limitation of aviation’s impact on climate would be beneficial from an environmen-
tal economics theory point of view? How are some of aviation’s climate relevant emissions regulated currently? These ques-
tions are discussed in the following section.
Environmental economics theory has shown decades ago that market-based measures based on marginal cost pricing
(e.g., taxes, charges and emissions trading) can lead to considerable benefits compared to rather traditional
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approaches, these economic instruments are generally characterized by reaching environmental targets very
cost-efficiently (see for instance Nordhaus, 1982).
Against this background the implementation of a charge on non-CO2 species, possibly combined with other instruments
could be considered among other options. In 2008, charges on aviation’s local NOx emissions combined with a distance factor
were proposed by some economists (CE Delft, 2008). Another possible instrument would be the trading of emissions allow-
ances for aviation’s climate relevant species. This requires the transformation of the non-CO2 effects in equivalent CO2
according to a suitable metric. Also, a tax on climate relevant species could be a viable option. In addition, operational mea-
sures such as climate optimized flight trajectories (Grewe et al., 2014 and Soler et al., 2014) could be worth considering. Both
charges and emissions trading are currently or will soon be applied for limiting some of aviation’s climate relevant emissions
in a number of countries:
In Europe, aircraft emission charges on local NOx and hydrocarbon (HC) emissions have been applied since the late 1990s.
Sweden started in 1997, Switzerland followed in 1998 (Unique AG, 2003). The UK airports London Heathrow and London
Gatwick acted accordingly in 2004 and 2005. Copenhagen Airport followed in 2010. In Germany, local charges on NOx
and HC emissions have been introduced at the airports of Frankfurt, München, Köln-Bonn, Hamburg, Düsseldorf and Stutt-
gart in the timeframe 2008–2013. The introduction of the charge is understood as a pilot phase with airports participating on
a voluntary basis. After this phase, the environmental and economic impacts of the charge should be investigated and the
design of the charge may be subject to modifications (Scheelhaase, 2010). To date, the environmental effects of the aircraft
emission charges have not been investigated quantitatively in any European country.
The charge in the abovementioned European countries regulates NOx and HC being emitted during the landing- and take-
off-cycle (Unique AG, 2003). NOx and HC are the main contributors to combustion-related local air pollution and precursors
of ground level ozone. A positive side-effect of the charge on local NOx emissions is that it will also reduce greenhouse gas
effects to a certain extent: Because more NOx friendly engines are used, the amount of emitted NOx will be reduced at cruise
level as well as below 3000 feet during the LTO cycle. However, it has to be taken in mind that a trade-off exists between the
reduction of NOx and CO2 emissions (Daley, 2010 and Szodruch et al., 2011). Most aircraft engines available today can tech-
nologically be optimized either to minimize fuel burn, and thus CO2 emissions, or to minimize NOx emissions (Rosskopf et al.,
2014).
At the level of the European Union (EU), the European Commission has been analysing since 2008, whether NOx charges
can be an appropriate instrument to reduce the non-CO2 climate impact of international aviation (Scheelhaase, 2010). Mea-
sures under consideration include local NOx charges modified by a distance factor, en-route NOx charges, an increased NOx
stringency for LTO emissions standard and a multiplier on CO2 emissions (CE Delft, 2008). This approach is part of the general
EU strategy to examine the full range of external costs for all modes of transport, to analyse the impact of the internalization
of external costs and to prepare a stepwise internalization programme for the EU (Council of the European Union, 1999;
Commission of the European Communities, 2001).
In the timeframe 2008 until 2015, a number of emissions trading schemes tackling climate change on a national as well as
on a supranational level have been or will soon be introduced. Among other sectors, aviation has been addressed as well.
However, the trading schemes are designed rather differently (Scheelhaase, 2011, 2014).
In the European Union, an emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) for the reduction of CO2 emissions from stationary sources
was introduced in 2005. In 2012, international aviation has been fully integrated into this trading scheme (Council of the
European Union, 2009a,b). The scheme covers all flights departing from or arriving at airports in the European Union,
Norway and Iceland (=European Economic Area, EEA). This way, both European and non-European airlines are addressed
by the regulations of the trading scheme. In this scheme, aircraft operators are obliged to hold and surrender allowances
for CO2 emissions (Anger and Köhler, 2010).
At the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) Assemblies 2007, 2010 and 2013, strongly diverting views of non-
EU countries were expressed concerning the EC Directives for the inclusion of air transport into the EU ETS. Contrary to the
EU Member States and the EU Commission, most other ICAO Contracting States believe that an inclusion of non-EU airlines is
only possible on the basis of mutual agreements which do not exist to date. In many countries opposed to the EU ETS, coun-
termeasures and restrictions on European airlines have been prepared, such as special taxes and traffic rights limitations
(Bartels, 2012). At the 38th ICAO Assembly in September/October 2013, the ICAO Contracting States agreed to develop a glo-
bal scheme for the regulation of international aviation’s CO2 emissions by the year 2016 and to introduce it by 2020 (ICAO,
2013b). As of July 2015, the CO2-regulation scheme is not defined yet, and most favourable options are an emissions trading
or an offsetting scheme.
Against this background, the Council of the EU and the EU Parliament agreed to limit the geographical coverage of the EU
ETS to emissions from all flights within the European Economic Area (EEA) for the period from 2013 to 2016, until after the
ICAO Assembly (Commission of the European Union, 2014).
In 2008 New Zealand introduced a national emissions trading system for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions (New
Zealand Government, 2014). Until 2013, several sectors have been gradually phased in the trading scheme. The first sector
under the trading scheme was the forestry sector which started trading in 2008. By 2010, the liquid fossil fuels sector as well
as the stationary energy and industrial processes sectors have become mandatory participants. The waste sector and the
importers of ‘synthetic’ greenhouse gases (HFCs, PFCs and SF6) followed in 2013. Contrary to the original intention, agricul-
ture only has reporting obligations in the scheme due to cost-containment reasons. Transport including domestic aviation
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costs of compliance to the aircraft operators in the form of increased kerosene prices (Scheelhaase, 2014). Fuels used for
international aviation (and marine transport) are exempt from the scheme.
According to the 12th Five Year Plan of 2011, China is planning to introduce a national carbon trading system
(Government of China, 2011). By 2016, the main emitting sectors of CO2 will be included. Among other sectors, domestic
aviation will be participating. By implementing a national CO2 trading scheme, China intends to reduce its growing demand
for fossil fuels and to limit the local and global impacts of energy related emissions (IETA, 2013). In order to find suitable
solutions for a Chinese national trading scheme, seven regional carbon trading pilot systems are currently being tested
(Chang and Wang, 2010; Stockholm Environment Institute/FORES, 2012). Apart from stationary sources in particular the
Shanghai pilot trading scheme requires six Shanghai based airlines to submit emission permits for their domestic operations.
The EU will provide expertise in setting up China’s national emissions trading system (European Voice, 2012).
In January 2015, South Korea introduced a national emissions trading scheme for the limitation of greenhouse gases. With
a cap of 573 MtCO2-equivalent in 2015, it is the second largest emissions trading scheme in the world after the EU ETS (ICAP,
2015). It covers about 60% of the national greenhouse gas emissions in the Kyoto basket (CO2, CH4, N2O, HFC, PFC, SF6). In the
Korean scheme the sectors steel, cement, petro-chemistry, refinery, power, buildings, waste sectors and domestic aviation
are included (ICAP, 2015). Installations emitting more than 25,000 t CO2-equivalent per year and entities emitting over
125,000 t CO2-equivalent per year are included on a mandatory basis. Other installations are allowed to opt-in on a voluntary
basis (Yong-Gun, 2012). Linking arrangements with the European and the New Zealand trading schemes are planned by the
Korean Government (Europolitics, 2012).
Overall, the global framework for the limitation of aviation’s climate relevant emissions is diverse. And until now, the
non-CO2 species have only been addressed scarcely both on ICAO and on a national level. Due to urgent environmental
needs, the political regulation of the full climate impact of aviation is strongly recommended in the foreseeable future.AviClim’s methodological approach
Scenarios and market-based measures investigated
How can aviation’s full climate impact, i.e., the CO2 and the non-CO2 effects, best be regulated from an economic point of
view? In order to investigate this question, four geopolitical scenarios (Fig. 1) have been designed, which differ in concerning
the level of international support for climate protecting measures in aviation. This way, the environmental and economic
impacts of different and in consideration of current political negotiations likely geopolitical coalitions can be investigated:Fig. 1. Groups of countries that apply the different regulatory measures assumed in the geopolitical scenarios. Countries marked in GREEN are supporting
the assumed market-based measure for regulating aviation’s climate relevant emissions in the scenario investigated. The blow-ups in ‘‘Scenario Great
Aviation Countries” show the United Arab Emirates and Singapore, respectively. The ‘‘Scenario Annex I Countries” also comprises the BRIC countries. (For
interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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national and national aviation’s CO2 emissions. As explained above, international aviation has been included in the EU
emissions trading scheme in 2012. Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein are participating in this scheme.
– Scenario ‘‘Great Aviation Countries” assumes that the main players in international and national aviation were supporting
the market-based measure under consideration. This way, the main emitters of climate relevant species from aviation
could be addressed.
– Scenario ‘‘Annex-I Countries” supposes that the countries which supported the Kyoto protocol in 1997 (so-called ‘‘Annex-
I Countries”) plus the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) would introduce the respective market-based mea-
sure in air transport.
– The geopolitical scenario ‘‘World”, finally, supposes a global support for the climate protecting instrument under consid-
eration. Clearly, this would be the best solution from an environmental stand-point as all climate relevant emissions
would be fully included. But negotiations in the past decades have shown that a global solution is very difficult to find.
Each of these geopolitical scenarios will be compared with a Business-as-usual Scenario which assumes a continuation of
the current climate protecting policies.
The four geopolitical scenarios have been combined with selected market-based measures for the reduction of aviation’s
climate relevant emissions which have been chosen in respect to economic efficiency, potential environmental benefits and
practicability. Market-based measures analysed include the following:
– an emissions trading scheme for regulating all climate relevant emissions from aviation,
– a climate tax for all climate relevant emissions and
– a NOx emission airline charge combined with a CO2 trading scheme and operational measures. Operational measures
assume that 50% of flights operated between 30N and 60N and on an altitude between 28,000 and 38,000 feet (about
9 and 12 km) will be flying 2000 feet (about 630 m) lower to reduce contrails and contrail cirrus. The additional fuel burn
resulting from a reduced flight altitude has been considered according to Fichter (2009).
Within AviClim it has been generally assumed that the commercial airline operators will be the accountable entities of
the market-based measure under investigation. Furthermore, it has been assumed that all flights to, from and within the
countries belonging to the respective geopolitical reduction scenario will be subject to the climate protecting political reg-
ulations, regardless of the airline’s country of origin. This means, for instance, that an US carrier in the scenario ‘‘Greater EU”
will have to fulfil the obligations of the climate tax for all flights to and from the countries of the ‘‘Greater EU” scenario, even
though the US government is not supporting the market-based measure in this geopolitical scenario.Models employed
Fig. 2 provides an overview of the AviClim modelling approach.
Our modelling grounds on the forecast emission inventory. The absolute amount of the CO2 emissions of aviation in the
timeframe 2010–2030 differentiated by the different geopolitical scenarios and years has been calculated by means of the
DLR tool VarMission (Schaefer, 2012; Schaefer et al., 2010). The use of such a tool was essential since no detailed and publicly
available statistics on this issue exist to date. Data basis was the global empirical flight plan data provided by Official Airline
Guide (OAG) timetables and complementary DLR developed flight plans for the future.
To compare the impact of CO2 emissions and non-CO2 effects we used CO2 equivalence factors which are calculated
with the response model AirClim (e.g., Dahlmann, 2012; Grewe and Dahlmann, 2012; Dahlmann et al., 2015). AirClim
combines pre-calculated, altitude and latitude dependent perturbations with emission data in order to calculateCO2 purchases from 
other sectors (only 
ET models) 
Fig. 2. Schematic of the AviClim modelling approach.
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near surface temperature change is presumed to be a reasonable indicator for climate change (Grewe and Stenke, 2008). Air-
Clim calculates the climate impact of different climate agents (CO2, H2O, NOx (O3 + CH4 + O3pm) and CiC (Contrail induced
Cloudiness, i.e. line-shaped contrails and contrail cirrus)) in dependency of the emission location. To find a reasonable com-
promise between calculation effort and accuracy of the results we decided to use only an altitude dependency of the climate
impact. Nevertheless we use horizontal emission distributions of nowadays air traffic to calculate the climate impact. Therefore
we calculated the impact of air traffic for each flight level separately. Then we got the CO2 equivalents by calculating the
impact of each species per kg emission or flown distances relative to the impact of one kg CO2. To this end we used the Aver-
age Temperature Response (ATR) with a time horizon of 20 and 50 years, respectively, to compare the climate impacts. As
mentioned above, ATR is the mean change in near surface temperature averaged over 20 and 50 years, respectively. The CO2
equivalence factors which in particular depend on flight altitude are shown in Fig. 3 for atr_20 and atr_50, respectively. An
emission of 1 kg NOx in an altitude of 30,000 feet, for example, has the same impact on climate over 20 years as 700 kg CO2.
The forecast emission inventory was combined with the CO2 equivalence factors to calculate the associated amounts of
CO2 equivalents of the non-CO2 species for each flight. For simulating the distribution of all climate relevant emissions in
three-dimensional space (longitude, latitude and altitude) and time, the newly developed and validated calculation model
4D-Race (4 Dimensional distRibution of AirCraft Emissions) has been employed. This model generates air traffic emission
inventories to serve as a basis for determining climate effects. It detects not only long-lived CO2 emissions, but also corre-
sponding emissions of short-lived air pollutants such as NOx, SOx and soot.
The regulatory measure assumed will affect the costs of the airlines under the respective scheme. Important parameters
for the costs of the market-based measures include the amounts of CO2 equivalent emitted on the flights under the climate
protecting measure and the prices for CO2 equivalent. As the future development of prices for CO2 equivalent is difficult to
foresee, three different price development paths have been assumed: (1) A ‘High Price Path’, (2) a ‘Low Price Path’ with a
price range of 10 USD per ton CO2 equivalent in the year 2010 (both Price Paths) to 80 USD per ton in 2030 for the ‘High
Price Path’ and 30 USD for the ‘Low Price Path’, respectively, and (3) the ‘Mixed Price Path’ which assumes low CO2 equivalent
prices for both trading schemes (trading of all climate relevant species and CO2 trading) and high prices for the climate tax
and the NOx charge. This way, the likely advantage of trading schemes which becomes manifest in lower emission prices (as
compared to taxes and charges) can be shown more explicitly.
In brief, the modelling of the costs of the market-based measures has been conducted by the following consecutive steps.
A detailed description is provided by Scheelhaase et al. (2015). At first, the revenue ton kilometres (RTKs) subject to the
market-based measure have been estimated for the years 2010–2030 on a flight-by-flight and yearly basis. Second, the asso-
ciated CO2 and non-CO2 emissions have been modelled by employing the models explained above. In these models, fuel effi-
ciency improvements of about 1.4 per cent per annum have been assumed. The absolute amounts of CO2, NOx, H2O, etc. in
tons result. Third, the climate relevant emissions subject to the respective geopolitical reduction scenario are multiplied by
the specific altitude dependent metric for CO2, NOx, H2O, etc. The summation of these terms forms the total amount of CO2
equivalent (in tons) under the geopolitical scenario investigated.
The three market-based measures investigated are designed differently in order to identify the most promising design
options in respect to economic and environmental efficiency: The climate tax charges the total amount of all climate relevant
species from the first unit emitted. The NOx charge, which will be combined with CO2 emissions trading and operational
measures as has been explained above, puts a price on the NOx emissions from the first NOx unit emitted. In contrast, for
both trading schemes (trading scheme for all climate relevant emissions and CO2 trading scheme, respectively) a free allo-
cation of 85% of 2010 emissions has been assumed. This assumption was inspired by the free allocation rule in the EU ETS.
Applying these rules, aviation’s free emissions are capped to 2010 levels under the emissions trading schemes. For anyFig. 3. CO2 equivalence factors (in kg/kg and kg/km) in dependency of flight altitude for several climate agents using atr_20 (left) and atr_50 (right) as
uniform metric, respectively.
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likely, emission permits will be bought from stationary sources because these emitters usually have much lower marginal
abatement costs than aviation. The free allocation of permits leads to relatively low costs for complying with the trading
schemes in the beginning of the timeframe analysed. In the course of time, the amount of emission permits which have
to be purchased rises because aviation is expected to grow until 2030.
The costs for complying with the market-based measure under consideration have been quantified by multiplying the
respective amount of CO2 equivalent subject to the regulation scheme by the assumed prices for CO2 equivalent, differenti-
ated by the three price paths explained above. These costs will lead to a production cost increase of the airlines regulated.
Under the modelling assumption that the airlines will try to pass-on the full cost increase to their customers, and will there-
fore act as profit maximizers, prices for air services will increase. How will demand for air services react to this price
increase? In general, this demand reaction depends on the price elasticities of demand. As empirical data of the price
elasticities of demand for air services show a broad range of possible figures (Oum et al., 1990, 1992; Lu, 2009), following
three cases of price elasticities have been analysed alternatively:
 Case 1: Demand for air services reacts perfectly inelastic. In this case, the quantitative demand for air services remains
unchanged.
 Case 2: Demand for air services reacts inelastic by a quantitative reduction of demand: A price elasticity of 0.8 has been
assumed. The quantitative demand reaction is under proportionate to the price increase by the airlines.
 Case 3: Demand for air services reacts inelastic by a reduction of demand: A price elasticity of2.1 has been assumed. The
quantitative demand reaction is disproportionate to the price increase by the airlines.
This way, the complete range of possible demand side reactions can be analysed. In practice, we believe, case 2 may be the
most likely reaction.
The demand reaction according to the cases 2 and 3 will have effects on the development of revenues of the airlines
addressed by the climate protecting measure. In a next modelling step the airlines will change their flight plans (supply side
effect) proportional to the change in demand. Implicitly, equality of demand and supply has been assumed here which is
plausible after a certain adaption period. This will lead to a decrease in air traffic and a loss of employment in the aviation
sector.
The employment effects have been quantified by using an Input–Output model. This model grounds on empirical Input–
Output tables available for most countries in the world (see Eurostat, various years, for example). It allows for an estimation
of the direct and indirect employment effect of the market-based measures investigated. This way, a comparative-static
analysis of the employment effects has been conducted. The employment effects of the market-based measures investigated
are presented and discussed in the AviClim full report (Scheelhaase et al., 2015).
The decrease in air traffic leads to a reduction in fuel used in our model. The reduction in fuel consumption has been esti-
mated by VarMission (see section ‘Models employed’) on a flight-by-flight-basis. This results in a decrease of climate rele-
vant emissions. Modal switching has not been considered in this study for simplification reasons. This will be subject to
further research. Therefore, environmental benefits calculated are at the upper end and may be smaller in reality.
For both trading schemes (trading scheme for all climate relevant emissions and CO2 trading scheme, respectively), addi-
tional CO2 savings can be derived from the CO2 purchases from other emitting sectors (e.g. stationary sources). These pur-
chases are necessary to comply with the trading schemes as has been explained above.
The reduction in fuel consumption and the purchases of CO2 permits will influence the temperature change induced by
aviation, which has been estimated by employing the AirClim model (section ‘Models employed’).AviClim’s main results
The following graphs and explanations provide selected AviClim results in detail. At first, the cost impacts of the market-
based measures analysed on the airlines are presented. As Fig. 4 illustrates, total costs for market-based measures regulating
aviation’s full climate impact will be the highest for a climate tax. In Scenario ‘‘Greater EU”, which assumes a political sup-
port for these climate protecting measures in the European Union plus in Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, under the
assumption of a moderate price development for CO2 equivalent (‘Low Price Path’) and of the metric atr_50, total costs
for the airlines will add up to 39 billion USD in 2030 at the most. In contrast, both an emissions trading scheme for all climate
relevant emissions (solid line) and a NOx charge combined with CO2 trading and operational measures (dotted line) will lead
to much lower overall costs: Total costs for an emissions trading scheme would amount up to 21 billion USD in the year 2030
and a NOx charge combined with CO2 trading and operational measures would add up to total costs of about 20 billion USD
for all airlines addressed by the regulating measure. This can be explained by the specific assumptions set for both trading
schemes analysed (trading scheme on all climate relevant emissions and CO2-trading scheme which has been combined with
the NOx charge) as mentioned above: For the trading schemes a free allocation of 85% of 2010 emissions has been assumed,
following the allocation rule of the EU ETS for aviation.
In the scenario ‘‘World” (Fig. 5), total costs for the three market-based measures investigated are much higher because in
this scenario all airlines would be subject to the climate protecting measure under consideration. If the climate protecting
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Fig. 4. Costs of different market-based measures analysed in Scenario ‘‘Greater EU”, assuming the ‘Low Price Path’ and the metric atr_50. The costs are
scaled to 2012 prices. The measure ‘‘NOx Charge” includes CO2 trading and operational measures (flying lower).
Fig. 5. Costs of different market-based measures analysed in Scenario ‘‘World”, assuming the ‘High Price Path’ and the metric atr_50. The costs are scaled to
2012 prices. The measure ‘‘NOx Charge” includes CO2 trading and operational measures (flying lower).
J.D. Scheelhaase et al. / Transportation Research Part D 45 (2016) 112–125 119measures were supported on a global level, total costs for a climate tax would add up to a nearly 340 billion USD in the year
2030 under the assumption of a high CO2 equivalent price development path and the metric atr_50. Again, the total costs for
an emissions trading scheme as well as for a NOx charge combined with a CO2 trading scheme and operational measures
would be significantly lower: up to about 200 billion USD (emissions trading) and 156 billion USD (NOx charge) in 2030,
respectively.
The introduction of a market-based measure with an assumed price of 10 USD per ton CO2 equivalent would lead to a cost
increase of about 0.03 USD per kg jet fuel. Accordingly, a price of 30 USD per ton CO2 equivalent would lead to a cost increase
of about 0.10 USD per kg jet fuel. For comparison, 2013’s jet fuel prices were about 0.9–1.0 USD per kg (IATA Platts, 2014).
An analysis of the specific costs (USD/RTK) shows a heterogeneous picture depending on market-based measure, the
geopolitical scenario and Price Path assumed: For instance, the specific costs for airlines under the ‘‘Great Aviation Countries”
scenario will increase by 0.230 USD per RTK on average (USD/RTK subject to the respective scenario) due to the climate tax in
the year 2030 (High Price Path), while the specific costs for the airlines under the emissions trading scheme for all climate
relevant species in the same year will increase by only 0.044 USD/RTK in the ‘‘Greater EU” scenario (Low Price Path).
Fig. 6 shows the large influence of the chosen metric on the results. In this figure, the total costs for the climate tax in the
year 2030 for the four geopolitical scenarios investigated are presented with a moderate CO2 equivalent price development
(‘Low Price Path’). Results for the metric atr_20 are marked in light grey, and results for atr_50 are marked in dark grey. Obvi-
ously, atr_20 leads to much higher costs than atr_50. This is because atr_20 weighs the effect of short-lived climate agents
such as ozone and contrail cirrus stronger than atr_50, as short-lived climate agents show a large effect at the beginning of
the time period analysed but a fast decrease in time, while CO2 has a low impact at the beginning, but the effects only rather
slowly decrease with time. If the resulting different total amounts of CO2 equivalent are multiplied by the (same) prices for
CO2 equivalent, total costs for the climate tax will differ accordingly (Fig. 6).
Fig. 6 also reveals that the differences between the geopolitical scenarios ‘‘Great Aviation Countries” and
‘‘Annex-I-Countries” are rather small: For the ‘Low Price Path’ and the market-based measure climate tax, e.g., total costs
Fig. 6. Influence of the chosen metric on the costs for the climate tax in 2030 for different geopolitical scenarios. The ‘Low Price Path’ has been assumed
here. The costs are scaled to 2012 prices.
120 J.D. Scheelhaase et al. / Transportation Research Part D 45 (2016) 112–125of about 115 and 111 billion USD have been calculated for ‘‘Great Aviation Countries” and ‘‘Annex-I-Countries”, respectively,
in the year 2030. This can be explained by the fact that the Annex-I Countries plus the BRIC States are mostly congruent with
the ‘‘Great Aviation Countries”. Not surprisingly, total costs calculated for the geopolitical scenario ‘‘World” are the highest,
about 10% more than for the ‘‘Great Aviation Countries”. This is true for all climate protecting instruments analysed. For the
‘High Price Path’ and atr_50, for instance, total costs range from 156 to 339 billion USD (NOx charge and climate tax, respec-
tively) in 2030.
In a next modelling step we calculated how the costs for the market-based measures will increase the production costs of
the airlines regulated. Under the assumption that the airlines will act as profit maximizers as mentioned above, prices for air
services will increase. The demand reaction according to the price elasticity cases 2 and 3 explained above will have effects
on the revenues of the airlines under the climate protecting measure. Modelling results show that under the assumption of a
price elasticity of demand of 0.8 (case 2), revenues will still be increasing steadily in the period 2020–2030, even though on
a lower stage than in the business-as-usual development. This is true for all metrics and price paths assumed. The same
applies to a demand reaction according to case 3 and the ‘Low Price Path’. These effects are shown in Fig. 7, which presents
selected demand side effects for the ‘High Price Path’ and the metric atr_50.
In contrast, under the assumptions of the metric atr_20, a demand reaction according to case 3, and the ‘High Price Path’,
airlines’ revenues will be shrinking drastically. If demand for air services will react to the high price increase by a dispropor-
tionate demand reduction, this will lead to strongly negative effects for the airlines under the climate protecting measure.
Under these assumptions, the disproportionate demand reaction and the high CO2 equivalent prices are interacting in an
unfavourable way. This applies to all climate protecting measures investigated.Fig. 7. Demand side effects of the Climate Tax in Scenario ‘‘World” differentiated by alternative price elasticities of demand (cases 1–3). The ‘High Price
Path’ and the metric atr_50 are assumed here. The costs are scaled to 2012 prices. Case 1 is identical to the Business-as-usual development.
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Here, a demand reaction according to case 2 has been assumed. Air traffic will be affected by the three market-based mea-
sures analysed in the range of minus 0.5% to minus 7% of Revenue Ton Kilometres (RTKs) in the period from 2010 to 2030.
Again, effects of the climate tax are the largest while the impacts of the emissions trading scheme for all climate relevant
emissions and the effects of the NOx charge combined with CO2 trading and operational measures are lower by far.
The reduction in air traffic leads to a reduction of climate relevant emissions from aviation in our model since less fuel
will be burned and also the non-CO2 climate effects such as contrails are reduced. Table 1 provides an overview of the change
in fuel consumption calculated for the different reduction measures in the year 2030 for the metric atr_50 and case 2
demand reaction. For the two market-based measures analysed, which include emissions trading, additional environmental
benefits are derived from the necessary purchase of CO2 allowances from other sectors. This is because under an emissions
trading scheme, the airlines can purchase emission allowances from other sectors (such as stationary energy plants or
energy-intensive industries) in order to comply with the regulation scheme.
Fig. 9 presents the impact of the reduced air traffic on climate in terms of CO2 equivalents for the ‘Low Price Path’ and the
geopolitical scenario ‘‘Great Aviation Countries‘‘. Although the air traffic reduction is the largest for the climate tax, the cli-
mate impact of the climate tax is lower than the effects calculated for the market-based measures ‘emissions trading for all
climate relevant species’ and ‘NOx charge combined with CO2 trading and operational measures’. This is due to the fact that
under both trading schemes purchases of CO2 permits from stationary sources also have been attributed to the environmen-
tal effects.
On what terms can these purchases of CO2 permits from stationary sources be attributed to aviation’s climate relevant
savings? This attribution can only be made if aviation’s demand on the market for CO2 permits provides incentives for addi-
tional CO2 reductions in other emitting sectors and additional supply of these permits will be created. Given the relatively
high marginal abatement costs of aviation, it seems reasonable to believe that airlines will be willing to pay higher prices for
CO2 permits than most other emitting sectors. Against this background it is plausible that aviation’s purchases on the CO2
permits market will result in additional CO2 savings of other emitters. On these conditions aviation’s CO2 purchases on
the CO2 permits market have been attributed to aviation’s climate relevant savings.
The temporal development of climate impact in terms of temperature change is presented in Fig. 10 for the two extreme
cases: the geopolitical scenario ‘‘Greater EU” with the ‘Low Price Path’ versus the geopolitical scenario ‘‘World” with the
‘High Price Path’. For the scenario ‘‘Greater EU” with the ‘Low Price Path’, but without the possibility to buy permits from
other sectors, only small impacts on the temperature change can be realized, as only a small part of global aviation isFig. 8. Change of air traffic in per cent relative to Business-as-usual. The scenarios ‘‘Great Aviation Countries”, the metric atr_50, the ‘Low Price Path’, and
the price elasticity ‘‘case 2” have been assumed here.
Table 1
Change in fuel consumption compared to Business-as-usual in the year 2030 for the case 2 demand reaction and the metric atr_50. NOx
charge includes CO2 trading and operational measures.
‘‘Greater EU” (%) ‘‘Great Aviation Countries” (%) ‘‘World” (%)
Low price scenario
Climate tax 1.8 5.9 6.7
Emissions trading 0.9 3.4 3.9
NOx charge 0.6 1.9 2.2
High price scenario
Climate tax 5.1 15.8 17.8
Emissions trading 2.7 9.2 10.4
NOx charge 2.4 6.5 7.4
Fig. 9. Climate impact in terms of CO2 equivalents for different market-based measures including CO2 purchases for the geopolitical scenario ‘‘Great
Aviation Countries”. The ‘Low Price Path’ and the metric atr_50 have been assumed here.
Fig. 10. Temporal development of temperature change for the scenario ‘‘Greater EU” with the ‘Low Price Path’ (left panel) and the scenario ‘‘World” with the
‘High Price Path’ (right panel). The Business-as-usual scenario is plotted for comparison.
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will be reduced by about 18% for the market-based measure emissions trading. If the whole world is supporting this climate
political measure, the temperature change will be reduced by 15% compared to the Business-as-usual (BaU) scenario without
purchases. If purchases are taken into account, the temperature change is reduced by up to 70% in the year 2100. Due to the
fact that for emissions trading the amount of purchases from other sectors is larger than the CO2 emission from aviation, the
temperature change decreases after 2040 despite constant aviation emission after 2030. The increasing temperature change
after 2030 for all other scenarios is due to the thermal inertia of the atmosphere and due to the fact that CO2 has a very long
lifetime and accumulates in the atmosphere. Overall, AviClim results show that environmental benefits are the greatest for
the emissions trading scheme for all climate relevant emissions from aviation.
Fig. 11 presents an overview of the relative climate impact reduction potential for the different market-based measures,
geopolitical scenarios and price paths analysed. The largest reduction potential is provided by a global emissions trading
scheme taking purchases of emission permits into account and a ‘High Price Path’ (about 40%). The difference between
the reduction potential of about 40% shown in Fig. 11 and the 70% shown before is caused by the metric used. If only the
temperature change in the year 2100 is taken into account, the impact of the reduced CO2 emissions plays a more important
role, as those emissions would otherwise accumulate in the atmosphere and lead to a large temperature increase. Analysing
the climate impact of the metric atr_50, the impact of the short-term climate agents ozone and contrail cirrus dominates,
leading to a smaller impact of the reduced CO2 emission.
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Fig. 11. Overview of the relative change in climate impact in terms of atr_50 due to different market-based measures for alternative geopolitical scenarios
and price paths (HP = ‘High Price Path’, LP = ‘Low Price Path’).
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The AviClim study presents a promising beginning towards understanding the options for including the full climate
impact of aviation in international protocols for climate protection. AviClim provides insights on the economic and environ-
mental impact, the economic efficiency and the consistency of the investigated market-based and operational measures for
the reduction of the non-CO2 impact of aviation. By analysing four different geopolitical scenarios of international support
for climate protecting measures in aviation, three alternative market-based measures, three price paths for CO2 equivalents
and three basic demand reaction cases, a large spread of options has been investigated both from an economic and from an
environmental point of view.
Results show that a global emissions trading scheme for the political regulation of both CO2 and non-CO2 emissions of
aviation under the assumptions explained above would be the best solution from an economic and environmental point
of view. Costs and impacts on competition could be kept at a relatively moderate level. At the same time, environmental
benefits are significant. For instance, under the assumption of the ‘High Price Path’ the temperature change induced by
aviation could be reduced by up to 70% in the year 2100 compared to the business-as-usual development assuming constant
emission after 2030.
For this positive environmental outcome, aviation’s purchases of CO2 permits from stationary sources are very important.
On what terms can these purchases of CO2 permits be attributed to aviation’s climate relevant savings? This attribution can
only be made if aviation’s demand on the market for CO2 permits provides incentives for additional CO2 reductions in other
emitting sectors and additional supply of these permits will be created. Given the relatively high marginal abatement costs of
aviation, it seems reasonable to believe that airlines will be willing to pay higher prices for CO2 permits than most other
emitting sectors. Against this background it is plausible that aviation’s purchases on the CO2 permits market will result in
additional CO2 savings of other emitters. On these conditions aviation’s CO2 purchases on the CO2 permits market have been
attributed to aviation’s climate relevant savings.
As modelling results for the geopolitical scenarios ‘‘Great Aviation Countries” and ‘‘Annex-I Countries” have shown, the
environmental and climate protecting benefits gained here are almost at the level of a global solution. This is because in
these geopolitical scenarios more than 90 per cent of the global flights would be regulated by the climate protecting measure
under consideration. This expectable result provides insights for the discussions on ICAO level: Depending on the actual
national and international support for climate protecting measures, a political solution for the ‘‘Great Aviation Countries”
or the ‘‘Annex-I Countries” could possibly be easier to find than for a global scheme. As negotiations in the past have shown,
in particular some developing countries responsible for very small amounts of climate relevant emissions have been blocking
global solutions. This leads to the conclusion that it would be advantageous to get started soon with a limited number of
countries supporting climate protecting measures in aviation than to wait for a worldwide agreement. To minimize compet-
itive distortions, the countries of origin of the main players in aviation should be included from the beginning.
The second best solution with regard to the market-based measure chosen would be the combination of a NOx charge
with CO2 trading and (simple) operational measures. These political measures will allow for environmental and climate
protecting benefits just below the benefits gained by the emissions trading scheme for all climate relevant species from
aviation as AviClim modelling results have demonstrated. A possible disadvantage of such a combination of market-based
124 J.D. Scheelhaase et al. / Transportation Research Part D 45 (2016) 112–125and operational measures could be higher transaction costs on the governmental as well as on the airlines level. This is due
to the fact that it will be more complicated to implement, handle and monitor three different regulatory approaches than one
single solution.
On the basis of the 38th ICAO Assembly Resolution (ICAO, 2013b) the discussion on ICAO level currently concentrates on
the design of offsetting schemes for the limitation of international aviation’s CO2 emissions. Offsetting is a variant of emis-
sions trading with some differences to the emissions trading scheme analysed within AviClim. As mentioned above, the
implementation of such an offsetting scheme is envisaged for the year 2020. It remains to be seen whether ICAO will be suc-
cessful within this timeframe as discussions are difficult as it is the case with many UN agencies and institutions. If ICAO
negotiations will succeed, AviClim results could be used to expand the CO2 scheme to the non-CO2 climate relevant species
from aviation as a next step. Here, both the extension of the CO2 offsetting scheme to other climate relevant species and the
introduction of operational measures such as climate optimal flight trajectories could be worthwhile considering.
Therefore, this study is a step towards developing climate-protecting measures addressing the full climate impact of
aviation. Future efforts are headed towards extending the AviClim model to biofuels, a larger use of climate-optimal
operational measures and to investigate the effects of modal switching. This would be of interest in order to improve the
model and to investigate aviation’s possibilities to abate climate relevant emissions in the medium term.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Wolfgang Grimme and Sven Maertens for helpful discussions. This study was funded by
the German Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung within the Programm ‘‘Ökonomie des Klimawandels.”References
Anger, A., Köhler, J., 2010. Including aviation emissions into the EU ETS: much ado about nothing? A review. Transp. Policy 17, 38–46.
Bartels, L., 2012. The WTO legality of the application of the EU’s emission trading system to aviation. Eur. J. Int. Law (EJIL) 23, 429–467.
Burkhardt, U., Kärcher, B., 2011. Global radiative forcing from contrail cirrus. Nat. Clim. Change 1, 54–58.
CE Delft, 2008. Lower NOx at Higher Altitudes – Policies to Reduce the Climate Impact of Aviation’s NOx Emissions. Final Report on behalf of the EU
Commission, Delft.
Commission of the European Communities, 2001. White Paper – European Transport Policy for 2010: Time to Decide. Component Object Model 370 Final,
Brussels.
Commission of the European Union, 2014. Reducing emissions from aviation. <http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/aviation/index_en.htm>
(retrieved 8 April 2014).
Council of the European Union, 1999. Directive 1999/62/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17th June 1999 on the Charging of Heavy
Goods Vehicles for the Use of Certain Infrastructures, Brussels.
Council of the European Union, 2009a. Directive 2008/101/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 19 November 2008 amending Directive 2003/
87/EC so as to include aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community. Off. J. Eur. Union, L 8/3,
Brussels, 13 January 2009.
Council of the European Union, 2009b. Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve
and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading system of the Community. Off. J. Eur. Union, Brussels, 5 June 2009.
Chang, Y.-C., Wang, N., 2010. Environmental regulations and emissions trading in China. Energy Policy 38, 3356–3364.
Dahlmann, K., 2012. Eine Methode zur effizienten Bewertung von Maßnahmen zur Klimaoptimierung des Luftverkehrs. DLR-Forschungsbericht 2012-05,
Cologne.
Dahlmann, K., Grewe, V., Frömming, C., Burkhardt, U., 2015. Can we reliably assess climate mitigation options for air traffic scenarios despite large
uncertainties in atmospheric processes? Trans. Res. Part D: Trans. Environ. (submitted for publication)
Dales, J.H., 1968. Pollution, Property and Prices, Toronto.
Daley, B., 2010. Air Transport and the Environment, first ed., Farnham.
Deuber, O., Luderer, G., Sausen, R., 2014. CO2 equivalences for short-lived climate forcers. Clim. Change 122, 651–664. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10584-
013-1014-y.
European Voice, 2012. EU and China team up on emissions trading. <http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2012/september/eu-and-china-team-up-on-
emissions-trading/75199.aspx> (retrieved 12 December 2012).
Europolitics, 2012. South Korea to Start Emissions Trading Scheme in 2015. <http://europolitics.info/external-policies/south-korea-to-start-emissions-
trading-scheme> (retrieved 12 December 2012).
Eurostat, various years. Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen, Luxembourg.
Fichter, C., Marquart, S., Sausen, R., Lee, D.S., 2005. The impact of cruise altitude on contrails and related radiative forcing. Meteorol. Z. 14, 563–572.
Fichter, C., 2009. Climate Impact of Air Traffic Emissions in Dependency of the Emission Location and Altitude. DLR-Forschungsbericht. DLR-FB 2009-22.
Forster, P.M., Shine, K.P., Stuber, N., 2006. It is premature to include non-CO2 effects of aviation in emission trading schemes. Atmos. Environ. 40, 1117–
1121. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.atmosenv.2005.11.005.
Frömming, C., Ponater, M., Dahlmann, K., Grewe, V., Lee, D.S., Sausen, R., 2012. Aviation-induced radiative forcing and surface temperature change in
dependency of the emission altitude. J. Geophys. Res. 1 (D19104). http://dx.doi.org/10.1029/2012JD018204, ISSN 0148-0227.
Fuglestvedt, J.S., Shine, K.P., Berntsen, T., Cook, J., Lee, D.S., Stenke, A., Skeie, R.B., Velders, G.J.M., Waitz, I.A., 2010. Transport impacts on atmosphere and
climate: metrics. Atmos. Environ. 44, 4648–4677.
Government of China, 2011. Government of China, 2011. 12th Five Year Plan. <http://www.britishchamber.cn/content/chinas-twelfth-five-year-plan-2011-
2015-full-english-version> (retrieved 12 December 2012).
Grewe, V., Frömming, C., Matthes, S., Brinkop, S., Ponater, P., Dietmüller, S., Jöckel, P., Garny, H., Tsati, E., Dahlmann, K., Sovde, O.A., Fuglestvedt, J.S., Berntsen,
T., Shine, K.P., Irvine, E.A., Champougny, T., Hullah, P., 2014. Aircraft routing with minimal climate impact: the REACT4C climate cost function modelling
approach (V1.0). Geosci. Model Dev. 7, 175–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.5194/gmd-7-175-2014, ISSN 1991-959X.
Grewe, V., Stenke, A., 2008. AirClim: an efficient climate impact assessment tool. Atmos. Chem. Phys. 8, 4621–4639.
Grewe, V., Dahlmann, K., 2012. Evaluating climate-chemistry response and mitigation options with Airclim. In: Schumann, U. (Ed.), Atmospheric Physics:
Background – Methods – Trends. Springer Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, pp. 591–606.
Grewe, V., Dahlmann, K., 2015. How ambiguous are climate metrics? And are we prepared to assess and compare the climate impact of new air traffic
technologies? Atmos. Environ. 106, 373–374.
IATA (International Air Transport Association), 2014. IATA Platts Jet Fuel Site. <http://www.platts.com/jetfuel>.
J.D. Scheelhaase et al. / Transportation Research Part D 45 (2016) 112–125 125IETA (International Emissions Trading Association), 2013. China Case Study, September 2013. <www.ieta.org> (retrieved 07 May 2015).
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 1999. Aviation and the Global Atmosphere, Special Report, New York.
International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP), 2015. ETS Detailed Information – Korea Emissions Trading Scheme. Last Update 5 February 2015.
<https://icapcarbonaction.com/index.php?option=com_etsmap&task=export&format=pdf&layout=list&systems%5B%5D=47> (retrieved 06 May 2015).
International Civil Aviation Organisation ICAO, 2013a. Global Air Transport Outlook to 2030 and trends to 2040. Circular 333, AT/190, Montreal.
International Civil Aviation Organisation ICAO, 2013b. Resolutions adopted by the Assembly – 38th Session, Montreal, 24 September – 4 October 2013.
Provisional Edition November 2013. <http://www.icao.int/Meetings/a38/Pages/resolutions.aspx> (retrieved 07 January 2014).
Lee, D.S., Fahey, D.W., Forster, P.M., Newton, P.J., Wit, R.C.N., Lim, L.L., Owen, B., Sausen, R., 2009. Aviation and global climate change in the 21st century.
Atmos. Environ. 43, 3520–3537.
Lee, D.S., Pitari, G., Grewe, V., Gierens, K., Penner, J.E., Petzold, A., Prather, M.J., Schumann, U., Bais, A., Berntsen, T., Iachetti, D., Lim, L.L., Sausen, R., 2010.
Transport impacts on atmosphere and climate: aviation. Atmos. Environ. 44, 4678–4734.
Lu, C., 2009. The implications of environmental costs on air passenger demand for different airline business models. J. Air Transport Manage. 15, 158–165.
Mannstein, H., Spichtinger, P., Gierens, K., 2005. A note on how to avoid contrail cirrus. Transp. Res. Part D 10, 421–426.
New Zealand Government, 2014. Climate Change Information <http://www.climatechange.govt.nz/> (retrieved 10 December 2014).
Nordhaus, W.D., 1982. How fast should we graze the global commons? Am. Econ. Rev. Pap. Proc. 72, 242–246.
Oum, T.H., Waters, W.G., Yong, J.S., 1990. A Survey of Recent Estimates of Price Elasticities of Demand for Transport. World Bank Working Papers, WPS 359,
Washington.
Oum, T.H., Waters, W.G., Yong, J.S., 1992. Concepts of price elasticities of transport demand and recent empirical estimates. J. Transport Econ. Policy 26,
139–154.
Rosskopf, M., Lehmer, S., Gollnick, V., 2014. Economic-environmental trade-offs in long-term airline fleet planning. J. Air Trans. Manage. 34, 109–115.
Schaefer, M., 2012. Development of a Forecast Model for Global Air Traffic Emissions, DLR Forschungsbericht 2012-08, Cologne.
Schaefer, M., Scheelhaase, J., Grimme, W., Maertens, S., 2010. The economic impact of the upcoming EU emissions trading system on airlines and EU
Member States – an empirical estimation. Eur. Transport Res. Rev. 2, 189–200.
Scheelhaase, J., 2011. Competitive distortions in the air transport market as a result of the upcoming worldwide emissions trading systems? Aerlines –
International Magazine for Students and Professionals of Aviation, e-zine edition, vol. 49, pp. 1–5.
Scheelhaase, J., 2010. Local emission charges – a new economic instrument at German airports. J. Air Trans. Manage. 16, 94–99.
Scheelhaase, J., 2014. International and national political regulations of aviation’s climate impact and cost impacts on air freight. In: Peoples, James (Ed.),
Current and Potential Role of Air Transportation as a Contributor to the Expansion of International Trade, Series ‘Advances in Airline Economics’, vol. 4.
Emerald, Bingley, UK, pp. 255–280.
Scheelhaase, J., Dahlmann, K., Jung, M., Keimel, H., Murphy, M., Nieße, H., Sausen, R., Schaefer, M., Wolters, F., 2015. Die Einbeziehung des Luftverkehrs in
internationale Klimaschutzprotokolle (AviClim). Endbericht, March 2015, Cologne.
Siebert, K., 1976. Analyse der Instrumente der Umweltpolitik, Goettingen.
Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI)/FORES, 2012. China’s Carbon Emission trading: An Overview of Current Development, Stockholm.
Soler, M., Zou, B., Hansen, M., 2014. Flight trajectory design in the presence of contrails: application of a multiphase mixed-integer optimal control
approach. Transp. Res. Part C 48, 172–194.
Szodruch, J., Grimme, W., Blumrich, F., Schmid, R., 2011. Next generation single-aisle aircraft – requirements and technological solutions. J. Air Transport
Manage. 17, 33–39.
Unique AG, 2003. Emission charges Zurich Airport Review 2003, Zurich.
Yong-Gun, Kim, 2012. Emissions Trading Scheme for Low-Carbon Green Growth in Korea. Korea Environment Institute, Presentation, 18 May, 2012.
<htpp://www.kei.re.kr> (retrieved 12 December 2012).
